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Abstract 
 
The recent research report of U.S. Department of Energy prompts us to re-examine the pricing 
theories applied in electricity market design. The theory of spot pricing is the basis of electricity market 
design in many countries, but it has two major drawbacks: one is that it is still based on the traditional 
hourly scheduling/dispatch model, ignores the crucial time continuity in electric power production and 
consumption and does not treat the intertemporal constraints seriously; the second is that it assumes 
that the electricity products are homogeneous in the same dispatch period and cannot distinguish the 
base,  intermediate and peak power with obviously different technical and economic characteristics. 
To overcome the shortcomings, this paper presents a continuous time commodity model of electricity, 
including spot pricing model and load duration model. The market optimization models under the two 
pricing mechanisms are established with the Riemann and Lebesgue integrals respectively and the 
functional optimization problem are solved by the Euler-Lagrange equation to obtain the market 
equilibria. The feasibility of pricing according to load duration is proved by strict mathematical 
derivation. Simulation results show that load duration pricing can correctly identify and value different 
attributes of generators, reduce the total electricity purchasing cost, and distribute profits among the 
power plants more equitably. The theory and methods proposed in this paper will provide new ideas 
and theoretical foundation for the development of electric power markets. 
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1. Introduction 
In the letter of United States Secretary of Energy Rick Perry (Perry [2017]) to Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) on September 28, 2017, it is addressed that short-run markets may not 
provide adequate price signals to ensure long-term investments in appropriately configured capacity. 
Also, resource valuations tend not to incorporate superordinate network and/or social values such as 
enhancing resilience into resource or wires into investment decision making. The increased important 
of system resilience to overall grid reliability may require adjustments to market mechanisms that 
enable better valuation. This conclusion is quoted from Quadrennial Energy Review (QER [2017]). 
Furthermore, the current wholesale market price formation rules are also doubted. Rick Perry urges 
FERC to take immediate action to ensure that the reliability and resiliency attributes of generation with 
on-site fuel supplies are fully valued and develop new market rules that will achieve this urgent 
objective. In the U.S. Department of Energy’s Staff Report to the Secretary (DOE [2017]), the 
problems with the current wholesale electricity markets and the relationship to reliability/resilience of 
power grids are investigated and several important findings are reported. It is suggested that FERC 
should expedite its efforts with states, RTO/ISOs, and other stakeholders to improve energy price 
formation in centrally-organized wholesale electricity markets. Energy price formation reform is 
supported after several years of fact finding and technical conferences. DOE staff identified several 
research topics including market structure and pricing mechanism for enabling equitable, value-based 
remuneration for desired grid attributes. 
The definition of electricity commodity model, cost structure and price formation mechanism are 
the most basic problems regardless of market structure. As the physical indifference (electricity 
produced by the power plants cannot be separated once injected into the power grid), and the existence 
of the complex physical network (power system), electricity becomes the world's most complex 
commodity. So the definition and pricing theory of electricity commodity are not so obvious. Spot 
Pricing of Electricity published in 1988 by Prof. F. C. Schweppe of the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology is the classic literature of electricity pricing theory and became the theoretical basis of spot 
electricity market design in different countries (Schweppe [1988]). Electricity price theory research 
should be divided into two parts, namely, electricity cost analysis (that is, what is a reasonable price) 
and electricity price formation mechanism in electricity markets. In the ideal electricity market, the 
clearing price should be equal to the marginal cost of power plants and marginal utility of power users. 
The theory of spot pricing is delicate in mathematics, but it does not conform to the physical 
characteristics of electricity production and consumption. In reality, the wholesale markets based on 
spot pricing theory has more or less problems. Besides those reported in DOE (2017), spot price often 
changes dramatically, brings great financial risk to market participants, financial instruments and other 
hedging measures are indispensable, which are often accompanied with unfair arbitrage; most power 
users are incapable (or unintentional) to respond to the rapidly changing real-time electricity price and 
rely on retailers to convert the real-time electricity price of the wholesale market into retailing packages 
with simple price structure, and thus the theoretical objective of enhancing demand-supply interaction 
through responsive spot pricing is not achieved; spot prices cannot completely cover the investment 
cost and result in insufficient investment capacity, etc. 
 
2. Principle of Spot Pricing 
The hourly spot price is determined by the supply/demand conditions that exist at that hour 
(Schweppe [1988]). 
In particular, it depends on that hour’s: 
• demand (in total and by location); 
• generation availability and costs (including purchases from other utilities); 
• transmission/distribution network availability and losses. 
The hourly spot price (without revenue reconciliation) is given by the marginal cost: 
( )
( )
[Total cost of providing energy to all customers now and through the future]
k
k
t
d t



  
where ( )k t  is hourly spot price for kth customer during hour t ($/kWh); ( )kd t  is demand of kth 
customer hour t (kWh), subject to constraints such as: 
• energy balance: total generation equals total demand plus losses; 
• generation limits: total demand during hour t cannot exceed the capacity of all the power 
plants available at hour t; 
• Kirchoff’s laws: energy flows and losses on a network are specified by physical laws; 
• line flow limits: energy flows over a particular line cannot exceed specified limits without 
causing system operating problems. 
Spot price is formed on basis of the principle of social welfare maximization in classical 
microeconomics. In its original theory, short-term and long-term, operation and planning are taken into 
account (Bohn [1982]). In real-world electricity markets, spot price is often calculated by Security 
Constrained Unit Commitment (SCUC), Security Constrained Economic Dispatch (SCED) and other 
short-term operation optimization model. However, the spot price calculation still adopts the hourly 
power balance model of the traditional economic dispatch, which divides the whole trading interval 
into a series of cycles, and further divides each cycle into several periods, and then the energy balance 
model is calculated period by period. Since the power (system demand) for each period is assumed to 
be constant, the energy balance model is equivalent to the power balance model. As shown in Fig. 1, in 
the calculation, the electricity commodity model is in fact defined as follows: 
The area under the entire load curve is divided into several "slips" by trading period, and then 
each slip is divided into several "segments". In each period, each winning bidder (unit) takes a 
"segment" (that is, a commodity), and in marginal price clearing mechanism, the settlement price for all 
commodity in the same trading period is the same (that is, the highest price of the winning unit). 
 
Fig. 1 Electricity commodity model in spot pricing theory 
 
3. The continuous time electricity commodity model 
Electricity markets based on spot pricing have the following shortcomings. 
1) Spot price calculation is based on traditional hourly dispatch (or power balance) model, and 
therefore overlooks the crucial time continuity in electric power production and consumption, which is 
of special importance with large-scale integration of wind, solar and other renewable energies into 
power systems and the sharp rising requirements of flexibility; the inter-temporal constraints are not 
considered seriously (although they are mentioned in Schweppe [1988] but not investigated 
thoroughly). 
2) Formation of spot price has a implied hypothesis that the electricity commodity in the same 
trading period are homogeneous, and then the technical characteristics and cost structure of the base 
load, intermediate load and peak load cannot be distinguished because the time dynamic characteristics 
of the different types of generator output are not considered. 
3) Although the original spot pricing model covers resource optimization from operation to 
planning over a long horizon (Bohn [1982]), such a large-scale optimization problem cannot be applied 
in practice. The actual market often uses Security Constrained Unit Commitment (SCUC) or Security 
Constrained Economic Dispatch (SCED) models to calculate the clearing prices, which cannot give 
price signals reflecting long-term capacity investment, and then cannot guarantee the adequacy of 
generation capacity. 
4) The production and consumption of electricity has the distinguishing feature of time continuity, 
and the commodity for sale or purchase is an "energy block" with certain duration for both the 
generator and the consumer. Energy (in MWh) is the main concern for power producers and users, and 
power (in MW) balance is mainly used as the physical constraint of power system operation (mainly in 
power flow equation). In the spot pricing theory, because time is not included in the commodity model, 
power balance and energy balance are equivalent, the physical balance constraints are directly used as 
the market equilibrium conditions, and this is not appropriate in economics. 
5) Energy type electricity commodity has characteristics different from power type electricity 
commodity. Energy type commodity is more similar to ordinary commodity. In long term transactions 
energy type commodity actually can be stored, mainly in form of coal (or other fuel) and reservoir 
storage, which is in contrast to power type commodity which cannot be stored. 
6) Electricity as a kind of the basic social product and means of production, the most critical 
consideration is to ensure sustained and stable supply. Society places value on attributes of electricity 
provision beyond those compensated by the current design of the wholesale market, such as jobs, 
community economic development, low emissions, local tax payments, etc. The highest market 
efficiency (especially the short-term spot market efficiency) is not so important.  
In order to emphasize the role of time in electricity commodity, this paper redefines the 
continuous time commodity model of electricity   1 2,P t t t t   by (power, time) pair, and the area 
under the power curve is energy, as shown in Fig. 2. When 2 1 1t t   and  1 2constP t t t   , it is 
degraded into hourly electricity commodity model in spot pricing theory. Since power can be viewed as 
a function of time, the continuous time electricity commodity model can be written as 
   1 2,P t t t t t  , and the numerical power value in the spot price definition becomes a function 
defined in the time interval  1 2,t t . Mathematical theories, such as functional analysis, variational 
method, etc. are needed for analysis. After the introduction of the continuous time electricity 
commodity model, the problem of social welfare maximization changes from the multi-stage static 
optimization to the continuous time functional optimization. The solution method is also changed from 
Lagrange method to solution of Euler-Lagrange equation. 
 Fig.2 Continuous time electricity commodity model 
 
4. Modelling of electricity market based on continuous time commodity 
The microeconomic model of social welfare maximization in Caramanis (1982) is still used in 
this paper to define the electricity market for reference. Some variable notations and expressions in 
Caramanis (1982) are still used. Because the purpose of this paper is mainly to explain the basic 
principles, the market model in Caramanis (1982) is simplified. 
Market participant cost/benefit 
Supposing ( )jB j   to be the variable cost (benefit) of market participant j in a market cycle, 
the cost (benefit) function can be written as: 
    , 0 Tj j jB B P t j t     
where   is the set of all participants in the market; jB  is a functional of power curve  jP t  for the 
market participant j, 0jB   denotes the generation cost when j is a power plant and 0jB   denotes 
the consumption utility when j is a power user; T is the duration of the market cycle. 
Social welfare and market objective 
The objective function is the standard social welfare maximization of the market in 
microeconomics, namely, to maximize 
social welfare = the value of electricity consumption - the cost of electricity production 
The objective function can be written as 
1 2max ( , ) ( ( ))n j j
j
W P P P B P t dt

                     (1) 
Constraints 
The key constraint is the power balance constraint, namely,  
0 = generation – losses - consumption 
which can be written as 
        0 , 0 T, 0j
j
e t P t L t j t L t                         (2) 
Note that time t in (2) is a continuous variable and no longer discretized as in traditional 
economic dispatch.   0jP t   when j is a power plant, and otherwise   0jP t   when j is a
 
power 
user.  L t  is the loss of active power. 
P 
t 
t1 t2 
Participant behavior 
With the continuous time electricity commodity model, the profit maximization model of market 
participants will take the form of integral (or functional of the power curve). The profit maximization 
model under spot pricing corresponds to the Riemann (Riemann) integral in mathematics, and the profit 
maximization model under load duration (called "measure" in mathematics) pricing is introduced in 
this paper, which corresponds to the Lebesgue integral. Note that the basic idea of load duration pricing 
has been described in Elmaghraby (1999). The basics of Riemann and Lebesgue integral are introduced 
in the appendix. 
1) The participant profit maximization model under spot pricing (Riemann integral form) 
Assuming that participant j obtains income (for a power plant) or pays purchasing cost (for a 
power user) at spot price   0 Tj t t    changing over time, the participant's objective is to 
maximize the net profit under production (consumption) capacity constraints, namely 
      
        
     
0
min max
max ( ) [ ]
. .
T
R
j j j j j j
t
j j j
N P t B P t t P t dt
s t P t P t P t


 
 

                     (3) 
For a particular participant,    min max,j jP t P t  are often constants (not changing over time). 
2) The participant profit maximization model under load duration pricing (Lebesgue integral 
form) 
Assuming that participant j obtains income (for a power plant) or pays purchasing cost (for a 
power user) at the price   min max
j jj
y P y P    determined by load duration (the load curve is 
assumed to be monotonically increasing in this paper, so the price function can also be written as a 
function of the load), the participant's objective is to maximize the net profit under production 
(consumption) capacity constraints, namely 
     
     
max
min
min max
max ( ) [ ( ) ( )]
. .
j
j
P
L
j j j j j j
P
j j j
N m y B y m y m y dy
s t P t P t P t
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 

                (4) 
where  ( ) : ( )j jm y m t P t y   is the measure of load function at value y; the sign before  ( )j jm y  
takes “+” sign when j is a power plant and takes “-” sign when j is a power user. 
Commodity model 
By the two different pricing methods, the models of electricity commodity are also different. 
Under spot pricing, the power curve    1 2,jP t j t t t    of participant j within a time horizon 
 1 2t t t t   is regarded as one item of commodity, and the total price is    
2
1
t
j j
t
P d

   

 . Then we 
can further define the per unit electric energy price of the commodity: 
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                                   (5) 
Under load duration pricing, the "energy block" of the participant j within a certain power range 
   1 2jP t P t P   is considered to be one item of commodity, i.e. 
 
   
 
   1 2 1
2 2
:
, :
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j j
j j
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P t j t t P t P
P P t P

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
, 
Its total price is  
2
1
( )
P
j j
P
y m y dy , and the per unit electric energy price of the commodity is: 
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                                     (6) 
Market mechanism 
The objective of the overall market optimization is to maximize the social welfare in (1) subject 
to the constraints in (2). It is obvious that the problem is a variational problem, and according to its 
optimality condition, the dual variable (shadow price) ( )t  can be obtained. 
In the market mechanism based on spot pricing, ( )t  is directly used as the market price ( )j t  
for each participant j, and that is,      j t t j    . ( )t  is the market equilibrium price, and at 
this price the individual's optimal of (3) is also the solution of the overall market optimization problem 
(1). 
In the market mechanism based on load duration, it is necessary to find the market price 
 ( )j jm y  for participant j, which satisfies      ( ) = ( )j jm y m y j    .  ( )m y  is the market 
equilibrium price, and at this price the individual's optimal of (4) is also the solution of the overall 
market optimization problem (1). A specific market model and case study is used to expound the details 
of the new market modelling theory. 
 
5. Solution of electricity market model based on continuous time commodity 
For convenience of solution and analysis, this paper considers the unilateral competition model of 
generation side electricity market. Assuming that the cost function of power plants takes the form of 
quadratic function and ignoring network loss, the problem of social welfare maximization in (1) and (2) 
becomes generation cost minimization, namely, 
    
     
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            (7) 
where  dP t  is the system load at time t. 
First, the variational problem with one constraint (7) is solved, and its Euler-Lagrange equation is 
   
1 1
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(8)
 
From the above equation j we can express  ( ) 1, ,jP t j n  by ( )t . Then by substituting 
these expression of 1( )P t  and ( )nP t  into the power balance equation in (7), ( )t  can be solved out, 
and then all 1( ), , ( )nP t P t  can be got. 
Then, the variational problem (3) in the sense of Riemann integral is solved as follows. By 
ignoring the capacity constraints, (3) is regarded as an unconstrained variational problem, and the 
Euler-Lagrange equation is 
    ' 0j j jC P t t                              (9)
 
By comparing (8) and (9), we can get 
  ( )j t t                                   (10) 
Namely ( )t  is the market equilibrium price. 
When the generation cost function takes the form of quadratic function, we have 
     1
1 1
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
 
             (11) 
which shows the consistence of spot price with load curve. 
Finally, the variational problem (4) in the Lebesgue integral sense is solved. Under the 
assumption of monotonically increasing load curve and unilateral competition of generators, (4) can be 
written as follows: 
       max
min
1 1min [(T ) T ( ) ( )]
P
L
j j j j j j j
P
N P P y C y P y m y dy           (12) 
where  ( ) : ( )j jm y m t P t y   is the measure of ( )jm y  at value y. 
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is the generation cost. 
When the cost function takes the quadratic form, it can be seen from (11) that ( )jP t  is a strictly 
monotonic increasing function, and there is ( ( )) Tj jm P t t  . We can use variable substitution 
 jP t y , then (12) turns into the following variational problem: 
          
     
T
0
T
0
max [(T ) ( )] '
                      = [(T )(2 ) (T t)] '  
L
j j j j j j j j
j j j j j
N P t C P t t m P t P t dt
t a P t b t P t dt


  
   


           (13) 
The Euler-Lagrange is 
      2a ' ( ) [(T )(2 ) ] 0j j j j j j
d
P t T t t a P t b t T t
dt
                    (14)  
By solving the first order linear ordinary differential equation (14), we can get the price function 
 j t
. 
On the other hand, from (11) there is 
 
1
1 1
2( )1
( )
1 12
2 2
n
j
j jd
j jn n
j
j jj j
b
aP t
P t b
a
a a

 
  

 
 
It is easy to find that the coefficient and nonlinear term of (14)  
   
1
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2 ,   2 ( )
1
2
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j j j j jn
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P t
a P t a P t b t
a
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are irrelevant to j, and then the solution of (14) is relevant to j, which means that the prices for all 
power plants are the same at the optimum, that is, 
   j t t                                   (15) 
Namely  t  is the market equilibrium price. 
 
6. Distribution of commodity values under two different pricing mechanism 
“Same quality same price” is the basic principle for commodity pricing. Under spot pricing 
mechanism, the underlying assumption is that all electricity commodities at the same trading period are 
homogeneous and therefore have the same marginal price (or value); and the electricity commodities at 
different trading periods are heterogeneous and have different prices (values), as shown in Fig. 3. For 
the same power plant (i.e., the cross bar consisting of multiple small segments of the same color in Fig. 
3), the value of the electricity commodities produced over time is different. This does not conform to 
the actual operation of power systems. At the same period (vertical bar consisted of segments with 
different colors), all electricity commodities are homogeneous. Then the obviously difference in 
technical characteristics and cost composition among the base load, intermediate load and peak load 
cannot be distinguished. This is one of the deficiencies of spot pricing, which cannot correctly value 
different attributes provided by different generators. 
 
Fig.3 Distribution of commodity values under spot pricing 
Under load duration pricing mechanism presented in this paper, all electricity commodities with 
the same system load duration (namely on a horizontal line representing a specific load level in Fig. 4) 
are homogeneous and therefore have the same marginal price (or value). As system load duration 
changes, the commodity price changes accordingly. The shorter the load duration, the higher the price 
(its economic meaning is that the peak load price is higher than the base load price). As shown in Fig. 4, 
for the same power plant (i.e., the cross bar with the same color), the value of the electricity 
commodities produced over time is the same. On the other hand, at the same period (vertical bar 
consisted of segments with different colors), all electricity commodities are heterogeneous, and the 
attributes and prices of power produced by the base load, intermediate load and peak load units are 
different. 
 
Fig.4 Distribution of commodity values under load duration pricing 
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7. Case study 
Assuming the load curve is monotonically increasing and as follows 
 ( ) 350 (1 2 ) [0, 1]dP t t t   
 
Assuming further that there are 3 power plants in the market, and the generation cost is different 
by 2 times successively, representing the low, medium and high cost power plant respectively. The cost 
function is as follows (where 0.001 0.07 0.2a b c  ， ， ) 
      
2
1 1 1 1
2
a
C P t P t bP t c    
      
2
2 2 2 22 2C P t aP t bP t c    
      
2
3 3 3 32 4 4C P t aP t bP t c    
From (8), the spot price and generation output of each power plant are solved as follows, 
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The dispatch schemes of the 3 power plants and system load are shown in Fig. 5. The spot price 
is shown in Fig. 6 (a). Obviously it is linear as the system load. 
The generation costs of 3 power plants can be obtained: 
   
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1 2
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1) Analysis of revenue and profit under spot pricing 
The revenues of 3 power plants can be calculated as 
     
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The profits of 3 power plants are respectively 107.69, 39.06, 8.04, which are shown in Fig. 7(a). 
The profit rates ( profit / cost 100% ) are respectively 77%, 59%, 30%. The total generation cost and 
total profit of 3 power plants is 232.53 and 154.79 respectively. The total electricity purchasing cost 
and profit rate of the market are 387.32 and 67% ( total profit / total cost 100% ) respectively. 
2) Analysis of market clearing price, revenue and profit under load duration pricing 
Because      ( ) 1 ,   a '  =0.2 1,2,3j j j jm P t t P t j   , by substituting the example data into 
the corresponding Euler-Lagrange equation (14), we can get: 
     2a (1 ) ' [(1 )(2 ) (1 t)] 0j j j j j j
d
t P t t a P t b t
dt
        
It can be arranged to ordinary differential equation: 
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Let  0 = (0)j  ，then 0.32C  , and we have 
     1 1 2=0.32(1 ) (1 ) (0.48 0.6 )   [0,1),   =1,2,3jt t t t t t t j 
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Because the measurement 1m t  , then 
   1 1 2( ) 1 =0.32 (0.48(1 ) 0.6(1 ) )  (0,1] 1,2,3  j jm t m m m m m j 
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By substituting the example data into (12), we can get the corresponding measurement functions: 
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Thus the revenues of 3 power plants can be calculated as: 
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The load duration price is shown in Fig. 6(b), which is nonlinear since it is related to the duration 
of system load. The profits of 3 power plants are respectively 84.37, 34.38, 12.72, which are shown in 
Fig. 7(b). The profit rates are respectively 60%, 52%, 48%. The total generation cost and total profit of 
3 power plants is 232.53 and 131.47 respectively. The total electricity purchasing cost and profit rate of 
the market are 364 and 57% respectively. 
From Fig. 7 we can see that because spot pricing mechanism cannot distinguish base load, 
intermediate load and peak load, the profits of 3 power plants differ greatly. Power plant 1 is allocated 
too much profit. Load duration pricing can reduce the total electricity purchasing cost, and the profit 
allocation among the power plants is more equitable. Compared with spot pricing mechanism, the 
profit of power plant 1 is reduced and that of power plant 3 is increased. 
As the two pricing mechanisms have their own pros and cons, the future research will consider 
combination of the two pricing mechanisms. 
 
Fig.5 Distribution of commodity values under load duration pricing 
    
(a) spot price                               (b) load duration price 
Fig.6 Prices under two different pricing mechanism 
 
 
(a) Profits under spot pricing            (b) Profits under load duration pricing 
Fig.7 Profits under two different pricing mechanism 
 
8. Conclusion 
In the letter of Secretary of Energy Rick Perry to FERC, it is highlighted that distorted price 
signals in the Commission-approved organized markets have resulted in under-valuation of grid 
reliability and resiliency benefits provided by traditional baseload resources. The Commission has 
recognized that there are deficiencies in the way the regulated wholesale power markets price power 
and that these deficiencies are undermining reliability and resiliency. So it is the Commission’s 
immediate responsibility to take action to ensure that the reliability and resiliency attributes of 
generation with on-site fuel supplies are fully valued and in particular to exercise its authority to 
develop new market rules that will achieve this urgent objective. In particular, the value of on-site fuel 
storage capability must be accounted for. 
To achieve these goals, the basic theories of electricity commodity and market mechanism are 
urgently needed for further study. Beginning with the analysis of wholesale electricity markets based 
on spot pricing theory, this paper presents the continuous time electricity commodity models, including 
commodity models under spot pricing and load duration pricing , based on which the market models of 
social welfare maximization are established. The market optimization models under spot pricing and 
load duration pricing correspond to Riemann integral and Lebesgue integral in mathematics 
respectively. The market equilibrium solution is obtained by solving the respective Euler-Lagrange 
equation. In particular, the feasibility of load duration pricing is proved by strict mathematical 
derivation. Finally, an example is given to verify the correctness of the theories and methods proposed. 
This paper is expected to provide novel ideas and theoretical basis for electricity market design. 
9. Appendix 
The basics of Riemann integral (Zaidman [1999]) and Lebesgue integral (Bear [1988]) are 
introduced as follows. 
1) Riemann integral 
Giving a bounded function  xf  on  ba,  and a dissection   of  ba, , 
0 1 2 1n na x x x x x b       . 
Then the interval  ba,  is devided into n small intervals  ii xx ,1  and the length of each 
interval is 1 iii xxx . A Riemann sum for  xf  is an expression 
  i
n
i
i xf 
1
 , 
where i  are arbitrarily chosen numbers in   1, 1,2, ,i ix x i n  . 
We say that  xf  is Riemann-integrable on  ba, if there exists a real number I  with the 
following property:  for 0, ( ) 0,       such that 
 
1
n
i
i
f x x I 

    
for all partitions  with   1
1
max i n
i n
x 
 
   and for any choice of  1, .i i ix x  The above found 
number I is the Riemann-integral of  xf  over  ba, ,  we denote 
 
b
a
I f x dx  , 
The idea of Riemann integral is making any partitions   in  ba,  and constructing Riemann 
sum, then take limitation over   for the Riemann sum is the integral  
b
a
f x dx . 
The Riemann integral permits a precise definition of the geometrical concept of "area" under a 
curve. So Riemann integral is an important tool in computing "area". 
2) Lebesgue integral 
   The main difference between the Riemann and Lebesgue integrals is that the former uses 
intervals and their lengths while the latter uses more general point sets and their measures. Thus it is 
not surprising that Lebesgue integrals is more general than the Riemann integral. 
   First, we introduce the definition of Lebesgue measure. We denote I as the open set  
  1 2, , , , 1,2, ,n i i ix x x a x b i n     
in nR  and I  as the volume of I . For any set nRE ,we define the measure of set E  to be the 
minimum of the sums of the volumes of families of open sets which cover E . To make this precise, 
we define the Lebesgue outer measure Em* as following 
 * is countable such thaf tin ,i i i
i i
m E I I E I
  
  
 
  
Similarly, we can define the Lebesgue inner measure Em*  as 
 * is countable such thasup , ti i i
i i
m E I I I E
  
  
 
  
If 
*
*m E m E , we say E  is Lebesgue measurable. 
Next, we introduce the definition of Lebesgue integral. Assume E  is a measurable set, 
mE   ,  xf  is a bounded function over E .  
 sup ( ),A f x x E

  ,   inf ( ),B f x x E

   
Suppose a dissection of the interval  A, B  
0 1 2 1A Bn ny y y y y        
Denote   iii yxfyxE  1 . For any   1, 1,2, ,i i iy y i n   , take summation 
  


n
i
iimEDfS
0
,   
We say that  xf  is Lebesgue-integrable on E  if  
0
lim ,S f D

exits, where 
 1max 1 .i iy y i n      
We denote 
   
0
lim ,
E
f x dx S f D

  
We could describe Lebesgue integral using Fig. 8. 
In order to obtain the area bounded by the curves  , 0, ,y f x y x a x b    , we could use the 
rectangles from the dissection of axis y ,  
        
        
1 0 4 1 5 2 1
3 2 6 3 2 7 4 3 .
b a y y x x b x y y
x x b x y y b x y y
         
        
 
When  1max 1 0i iy y i n      , then the summations of the areas of the rectangular is 
the Lebesgue integral of  xf . 
 Fig. 8 
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